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1. INTRODUCTION AND THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
This is the first study to examine the effects of financial distress on the ownership 
structure of distressed companies in the Republic of Serbia (RS). Compared to 
developed countries (primarily the US and Germany), the RS has distinct corpo-
rate governance features and bankruptcy rules that will be explained below.
After privatisation, which commenced in 1991, the majority of Serbian com-
panies have a high level of ownership concentration. The control of manage-
ment is typically tight, and decision-making authority tends to be concentrated 
in the hands of a few people. The largest owners are involved both in strategic 
and day-to-day decisions. Moreover, controlling shareholders appoint managers 
from among their relatives. In transition economies with a poor legal protec-
tion of minority shareholders, ineffective enforcement of contracts, undeveloped 
capital markets, and institutional shortfalls such as the RS, ownership concentra-
tion ensures effective control and the highest rate of return on invested capital 
(Cerovic et al. 2014). At the same time, the major owners can gain substantial 
power, which strengthens their position and enables them to expropriate minority 
shareholders. 
Concerning bankruptcy proceedings, the Serbian government adopted a mod-
ern bankruptcy law that is very similar to the US and German bankruptcy codes 
(for details, see Appendix 1). Serbian bankruptcy law envisages that a reorgani-
sation plan can be filed in the Commercial Court together with an insolvency 
petition (which is called a pre-pack reorganisation plan), or in a regular insol-
vency proceeding within 90 days after opening the bankruptcy (which is called 
a reorganisation plan). Only a debtor (i.e. a company’s management) has the 
capacity to file a pre-pack reorganisation plan. In regular bankruptcy proceed-
ings, the debtor, insolvency administrators, creditors, and debtor’s owners can 
file the reorganisation plan. Before a reorganisation plan is filed with the court, 
the company must meet the insolvency criteria. However, a company’s manage-
ment and its owners are not obliged to declare the bankruptcy of the company 
once the insolvency criterion is met. In almost all reorganisation cases, the court 
appoints insolvency administrators who verify the legality of the reorganisation 
plan and the bankruptcy proceedings, give consent to the company’s cash spend-
ing, asset disposals, and other measures requested by the court. Voting for a re-
organisation plan is within the classes of the creditors’ claims, and the number of 
an individual creditor’s votes depends on the value of the claims. Pursuant to the 
Amendments of the Bankruptcy Law in August 2014, claims of the company’s 
owners and other affiliated persons who are not engaged in the business of lend-
ing money as their main activity are classified in a special class, and they do not 
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vote for the reorganisation plan. The existing bankruptcy law does not envisage 
equity class. Also, the interests of the existing owners are not represented through 
official committees. 
Due to an undeveloped capital market, banks are the main liquidity provid-
ers to the corporate sector. During the first stage of the crises, the banks usually 
pursued a soft-loan strategy. The rolling over of bad debts was common. How-
ever, the majority of private arrangements with debtors failed, resulting in an 
increased number of bankruptcy filings recorded in 2011. During the bankruptcy 
proceedings, the banks retained a passive role, and by supporting the reorganisa-
tion plans proposed by the companies’ management, they tried to cover up losses 
and avoided writing off bad debts. Over the last two years, the situation has im-
proved slightly, and the banks have started to assume a more prominent role in the 
bankruptcy proceedings and the reorganisation process of distressed companies. 
The role of the state in bankruptcy proceedings has until now remained pas-
sive. In order to avoid the contraction of the entire economy and the social costs 
that would arise from massive lay-offs, the state predominantly supports the re-
organisation of distressed companies. A similar behaviour was also observed in 
other former socialist economies (Schaffer 1998).  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present 
the theoretical framework and the hypotheses that we have developed for the 
purpose of investigating the influence of financial distress on companies’ own-
ership structure. In Section 4, we describe the sample and the data sources, the 
descriptive statistics, the dependent and explanatory variables used, and, finally, 
our models. Section 5 includes a discussion of our empirical evidence and the 
limitations of the research. The final section provides concluding remarks. Ap-
pendix 1 shows the differences among the US, German and Serbian bankruptcy 
rules, while Appendix 2 summarises the research variables.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Most of the research on the effects of financial distress on corporate control to 
date is based on the experience of developed economies (primarily the US and 
Germany), and there are virtually no such or similar studies for transition econo-
mies (except for Asia). Analysing 61 US distressed companies, Gilson (1990) de-
termined that bank lenders frequently become major shareholders in companies 
that adopt a reorganisation plan under Chapter 11: on average, they receive 79% 
of the company’s shares and a median of 88%. Using a sample of 43 publicly held 
US companies filing for bankruptcy, LoPucki – Whitford (1993) confirmed a 
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significant change in their ownership. The average percentage of shares allocated 
to old equity holders upon adopting a reorganisation plan was 22%, compared to 
62% for solvent companies. Gilson et al. (2000) found that equity investments in 
the reorganised companies can be used for the transfer of effective control over 
the company. New investors owned a median 54% of equity shares after equity 
investments in 12 of 63 distressed companies. On examining 184 US companies 
that declared bankruptcy, Jory – Madura (2010) noted that 33% of the previous 
owners did not retain their equity interest in the reorganised companies and that 
the majority of shares were distributed to creditors (68% of them received equity 
in the reorganised companies). Köke (2001) analysed a sample of 946 German 
companies and reached the conclusion that changes in ultimate ownership are 
more frequent for companies with high leverage, while less likely for large com-
panies and those with high ownership concentration. Taking a sample of over 
1500 large- and medium-sized German corporations, Heiss – Köke (2004) found 
that poor performance, weak corporate governance, high leverage, and the small 
size of the company influenced ownership change in a bank-based economy. The 
impact of ownership concentration on ownership change is negative for com-
panies that operate under the control of one large shareholder, while companies 
with a more dispersed ownership structure demonstrate a negative effect in cases 
involving higher levels of concentration and a positive effect for lower levels. 
They also concluded that companies with high insider ownership and a com-
plex ownership structure were less likely to experience changes in ownership 
structure. In their analysis of 267 German companies that suffered from repeated 
interest coverage shortfalls, Jostarndt – Sautner (2006) observed a significant 
decrease in ownership concentration as a result of the withdrawal of private in-
vestors from the ownership scheme, while the ownership belonging to banks and 
outside investors nearly doubled. Median ownership concentration, measured by 
a Herfindahl index, declined from 26% in the year preceding the distress time to 
16% four years after the distress time. 
Given the great involvement of owners in the management of Serbian compa-
nies, one of the important findings of previous studies involves the influence of 
bankruptcy on management turnover. Previous studies conducted for the US and 
German market point out a negative association between corporate performance 
and top management turnover. In these markets, top management turnover rates 
range from 13% to 91% (Gilson 1989; LoPucki – Whitford 1993; Betker 1995; 
Franks – Mayer 2000; Jostarndt – Sautner 2006). 
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3. HYPOTHESES
The arguments in the above literature review lead us to three main hypotheses 
describing the influence of financial distress on ownership structure. 
Hypothesis 1: A change in ownership structure is less likely for large companies 
and companies with a complex ownership structure. 
Hypothesis 2: A change in ownership structure is less likely for companies with 
highly concentrated ownership operating under the control of one or a small 
number of large shareholder(s). At the same time, a change in the ownership 
structure is more likely for companies in which the owners were involved in the 
company’s management before filing for bankruptcy.
Hypothesis 3: Existing ownership structures are more likely to be changed in 
companies with poor financial performance and a high level of leverage. 
In order to avoid time-consuming alternatives, creditors could support reor-
ganisation plans submitted by the company’s management that envisage an un-
changed ownership structure for the distressed company upon adopting the reor-
ganisation plan. In this respect, we shall propose an additional hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4: The existing ownership structures are more likely to be changed in 
the companies that spend a longer time in bankruptcy. 
4. METHODOLOGY AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
4.1. Sample and data sources
We began our research with the analysis of 69 large and medium-sized privately 
owned non-financial companies organised as joint-stock or limited liability form. 
A company is considered to be privately owned when the state owns less than 
50% of the company’s shares in the year of filing bankruptcy; otherwise, it is 
considered to be state owned. The 50% ownership gives the company’s owner 
sufficient control over its decision-making processes. All of the observed com-
panies had completed bankruptcy through the adoption of a reorganisation plan 
in accordance with the Bankruptcy Law between January 1, 2009, and June 30, 
2015. Our investigation started in 2009 due to the fact that reorganisation plans 
for the majority of the reorganised companies were not publicly available prior 
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to that year. We excluded state-owned companies from our sample because the 
selection of managers in these companies is highly politicised. Furthermore, we 
did not analyse financial institutions subject to special bankruptcy regulations. 
The official information concerning 69 companies that adopted a reorganisa-
tion plan is not publicly available; thus, we obtained the requested information 
from the Bankruptcy Supervision Agency, as well as from 8 of the 16 commercial 
courts. The information regarding the reorganisation plans and other relevant data 
for this research were obtained from the Serbian Business Registers Agency, the 
Portal of the Serbian Commercial Courts, the insolvency administrators, the com-
panies’ official websites, and the Boniteti.rs and Poslovna.rs websites. 
In classifying a company as financially distressed, we used the definition of 
Asquith et al. (1994), who argued that a company is classified as financially 
distressed if its earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortisation 
(EBITDA) are less than the reported interest expense over a span of any two con-
secutive years, or if EBITDA is less than 80% of its interest expense in any year. 
We excluded four companies from the sample, as they were not deemed to be in 
financial distress. We were not able to retrace the control chain for two compa-
nies, which is why they are excluded from the final sample. Our final sample is 
comprised of 63 medium- and large-sized private companies, organised as joint 
stock (24 companies: 38%) or limited liability (39 companies: 62%) companies. 
The average assets of the analysed companies were EUR 23.8 million and sales 
EUR 14.8 million.
4.2. Descriptive statistics
As can be seen in Table 1, the majority of companies in the final sample belonged 
to the manufacturing industry (52.4%), with a significant number belonging to 
wholesale trade (17.5%) and construction (12.7%). 
The figures presented in Table 2 indicate the increased number of bankruptcy 
filings starting in 2011 (2011 and 2012: 19%, 2013: 29%, 2014: 21%), with bank-
ruptcy ending as a result of the adoption of a reorganisation plan in 2013 (27%) 
and 2014 (33%). 
With regard to ownership structure, most of the companies in the final sample 
were owned by individuals and other corporations, while only a small fraction by 
banks or the state (average share less than 5%). In companies with a changed own-
ership structure, the ownership share of individuals decreased by 28% as a result 
of debt-equity swaps. As demonstrated in Table 3, the ownership concentration 
was at a high level in both of the periods observed, with the average equity hold-
ings of the largest owner standing at approximately 70%. The equity holdings of 
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the second largest owner also stayed at a stable level (11–13%). More than 70% 
of the companies with a changed and unchanged ownership structure had their 
ultimate owner in a filing year, while after the adoption of the reorganisation plan, 
57% of the companies with a changed ownership structure had their ultimate 
owner. In terms of the complexity of the ownership structure, a pyramid owner-
ship structure was frequently found for all of the observed companies (i.e. more 
than half of them employed a pyramidal structure), while cross-ownership was 
rare (only four companies in the sample employed cross-ownership).
During the observed period, the ownership structure changed for 14 compa-
nies; in four of them, the previous owners retained a decreased ownership share 
with an average decrease of equity holdings by 75%, while for 10 companies, the 
ownership structure changed completely (i.e. the previous owners did not retain 
equity holdings in the reorganised companies). In one company, the reorganisa-
tion plan envisaged a debt-to-equity conversion immediately after the adoption 
of the plan. For the purpose of this research, we assumed that the debt-to-equity 
conversion was finalised by the end of June 2015, despite the fact that it was 
Table 1. Sample distribution at the one-digit SIC code level
Sample Number %
Manufacturing 33 52.38
Wholesale trade 11 17.46
Construction 8 12.70
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 4 6.35
Real Estate 3 4.76
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, Sanitary Services 2 3.17
Mining 1 1.59
Retail trade 1 1.59
Total 63 100.00
Table 2. Sample distribution per bankruptcy filing year and the year in which bankruptcy ended
Year
Bankruptcy filing year Year in which bankruptcy ended
Frequency % Frequency %
2009 1 1.6 0 0.0
2010 7 11.1 3 4.8
2011 12 19.1 8 12.7
2012 12 19.1 6 9.5
2013 18 28.6 17 27.0
2014 13 20.6 21 33.3
2015 0 0.0 8 12.7
Total 63 100.0 63 100.0
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still in progress during the time the research was conducted. In the companies in 
which the owners retained a decreased equity share after the adoption of a reor-
ganisation plan, the average decrease in the ownership share was 57%. It could 
be observed that the ownership structure changed as a result of the following 
occurrences: debt-to-equity conversions (11 cases), new investments made by a 
strategic partner (1 case), and termination of privatisation contracts, whereby the 
state became a major proprietor of the reorganised company (2 cases). In all cases 
in which the ownership structure changed as a result of debt-equity swaps, com-
mercial creditors became the major owners of the reorganised companies, while 
in only 3 companies did the banks have an equity share after the adoption of the 
reorganisation plan. The average time needed to resolve the bankruptcy case was 
longer for companies with a changed ownership structure: 17.3 months compared 
with 10.1 months for companies with an unchanged ownership structure. 
Of the 49 companies in which the ownership structure remained unchanged, 
the companies’ managerial functions in 35 continued to include the involvement 
of the existing owners or their family members after the adoption of the reor-
ganisation plan, in comparison to the filing year, where this was observed in 37 
Table 3. Composition of the ownership structures between the groups and the bankruptcy periods
 
Bankruptcy filing year
Change in ownership No change in ownership
Equity holdings Min. Max. Mean Std. deviation Min. Max. Mean
Std. 
deviation
Individuals 0.00 1.00 0.42 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.54 0.44
Corporations 0.00 1.00 0.57 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.44
State 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.33 0.01 0.05
Banks 0.00 0.23 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.01
1st largest owner 0.23 1.00 0.68 0.24 0.14 1.00 0.753 0.27
2nd largest owner 0.00 0.44 0.14 0.13 0.00 0.50 0.13 0.17
No. of companies 14 49
 
Year in which the bankruptcy ended
Change in ownership No change in ownership
Equity holdings Min. Max. Mean Std. deviation Min. Max. Mean
Std. 
deviation
Individuals 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.27 0.00 1.00 0.54 0.44
Corporations 0.00 1.00 0.63 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.44
State 0.00 1.00 0.22 0.37 0.00 0.34 0.01 0.05
Banks 0.00 0.21 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.26 0.01 0.04
1st largest owner 0.12 1.00 0.67 0.31 0.17 1.00 0.74 0.28
2nd largest owner 0.00 0.33 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.50 0.13 0.16
No. of companies 14 49
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companies. In some cases, however, the owners’ rights were partially limited as 
a result of plans to establish a creditors’ committee or another similar body. In 24 
companies with an unchanged ownership structure, the reorganisation plan envis-
aged the establishment of such a body, which would be tasked with monitoring 
the company’s performance during the reorganisation or providing consent to 
financial or investment decisions. 
In order to test our hypotheses, we have introduced variables and defined ap-
propriate models.  
4.3. Model inputs
We used one dependent variable and four sets of explanatory variables. 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable was OWN CHANGE, which observed two outcomes: we 
attributed 1 in the event that the ownership structure has undergone changes after 
the filing year or in the year after the adoption of the reorganisation plan, and 0 
if no change is made to the ownership structure during the observed period. We 
consider that the ownership structure has undergone a change if the following has 
occurred: 
(1)  The ownership structure is completely changed (i.e. the previous owners 
do not retain an equity interest in the reorganised company),
(2)  Owners with an equity interest of 25% or more do not retain their share in 
the reorganised company, or this share is less than 25% after the adoption 
of the reorganisation plan, or 
(3)  The new owner acquires not less than 25% of the equity shares in the re-
organised company. 
The second and the third definition of change in the ownership structure follow 
the concept of corporate control used herein. 
The change in the ownership structure is observed during the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings and one year after the adoption of the reorganisation plan. From our point 
of view, these changes are closely linked to financial distress. We equally observe 
the following types of change in ownership structure: sales of equity holdings by 
existing owners, debt-equity swaps, investments by third parties made during the 
bankruptcy proceedings or after the reorganisation plan was adopted, which were 
converted into capital, and cases in which the state became the major proprietor 
as a result of the termination of privatisation contracts. We classified cases in 
which the owner dies as a non-turnover event. In the RS, hostile takeovers during 
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bankruptcies rarely occur, and in most cases, the existing owners independently, 
or jointly with creditors, find strategic investors who are willing to acquire an 
equity share in the distressed company, purchase debts from existing creditors 
or invest resources in the distressed company, and at a later stage, convert their 
claims into equity. These transactions are finalised before or immediately after 
the adoption of the reorganisation plan. On the other hand, debt-equity swaps in 
the RS occur less frequently – first, because the opportunity to sell an equity share 
during the reorganisation period is small due to the lack of large investors that are 
willing to buy shares in companies that are in financial distress, while a second-
ary market for these shares is practically non-existent. Moreover, banks, as main 
creditors of the corporate sector, are constrained by the Law on Banks to perform 
debt-to-equity conversions and they also do not have an interest in being involved 
in the equity of distressed companies. The existing Law on Banks limits a bank’s 
investments in the equity of a single company to 10% of the bank’s capital. This 
limitation applies to all banks, and there is no exception in the case of debt-equity 
swaps in bankruptcy proceedings. 
In order to identify the factors that influence change in the ownership struc-
ture, we employed 4 sets of explanatory variables. 
Explanatory variables
– The first set 
Size. Change in corporate control is less likely to occur in large companies, as 
found in Köke (2001) and Heiss – Köke (2004). This can be explained by the fact 
that monitoring and agency costs could be greater in larger firms. To avoid these 
costs, creditors may have fewer incentives to convert their claims into equity, and 
potential buyers may be less interested in acquiring shares in larger companies 
that are in financial distress. The logarithm of a company’s total assets and sales 
(Log(AT), Log(S)) is used to measure the size. 
Complexity of ownership structure. Companies with a more complex ownership 
structure are less likely to experience a change in ownership (Köke 2001; Heiss 
– Köke 2004). This can be attributed to the fact that they may have higher costs 
of monitoring, which imposes a need for employing more skilled managers and 
the greater involvement of owners in the monitoring. In order to avoid such costs, 
creditors may have fewer incentives to convert their claims into equity, while po-
tential buyers may be less motivated to acquire shares in companies with a more 
complex ownership structure. Based on our data sample, we have only analysed a 
pyramid structure, while cross-ownership was not analysed, bearing in mind that 
it was infrequent. In this respect, we introduced a dummy variable PYRAMID in 
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our model, whose presence designates a value of 1 or whose absence designates a 
value of 0. We analyse the influence of the company’s size and the complexity of 
the ownership structure together because we assumed that larger companies will 
be more likely to have a complex ownership structure. 
– The second set 
Ownership concentration. Ownership concentration acts as an important mecha-
nism of corporate governance. The business of distressed companies is highly 
dependent on the existing owners, because they are in the unique position of be-
ing well conversant with the company’s business, and their reputation and politi-
cal connections give them power over the bankruptcy proceedings. Furthermore, 
large equity holders may prefer to sell whole equity holdings rather than just a 
portion, thereby making the process of finding potential buyers more difficult, 
particularly for companies in financial distress. 
In order to measure ownership concentration, the average size of the largest 
equity holder must be included. The variable Log(M1) is introduced in the re-
search, which represents the logarithm of one plus the equity holdings of the first 
largest proprietor. Due to the presence of instances of high ownership concentra-
tion within our sample, the equity holdings of the second and third largest owners 
as explanatory variables were excluded from our models. With regard to compa-
nies with complex ownership structures, in order to identify whether a company 
has a high ownership concentration, it is necessary to identify the presence of an 
ultimate owner. This research uses the concept of corporate control developed by 
Heiss – Köke (2004, p. 192), who advocate the application of the three following 
rules: 
Rule 1 (Strong Ownership Rule): A chain of control is pursued to the following 
level, if 50% or more of the analysed shareholder is owned by a shareholder at the 
next level, while all other shareholders at the next level possess less than 50%. 
Rule 2 (Weak Ownership Rule): If the strong ownership rule cannot be applied, 
a chain of control is pursued to the following level if 25% or more of the analysed 
shareholder is owned by a shareholder at the next level, while all other sharehold-
ers at the next level possess less than 25%. 
Rule 3 (Stop Rule): If Rules 1 and 2 cannot be applied, a chain of control is 
not pursued further, signifying that the company does not have an ultimate owner. 
We have applied the same rule in the case of reorganised companies in which the 
state is in possession of the major ownership share. 
At a given level of the ownership concentration, the thresholds of 50% and 
25% provide to an ultimate shareholder sufficient voting rights to exercise sig-
nificant influence over a company’s decision-making process .
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In counting ultimate voting rights, the “weakest link” principle was employed. 
If a shareholder controls a share of x of the votes within company A, which equal-
ly controls a share of y of the votes within another company (company B), it is as-
sumed that this shareholder controls the share of either x or y, depending on which 
of these two values is lower. For a large number of the companies, information 
regarding voting rights was not publicly available; therefore, instead of voting 
rights, we used cash flow rights in determining the presence of an ultimate owner. 
This approach did not distort the results obtained, given the fact that the majority 
of Serbian companies respect the one share, one vote rule. 
In order to determine the influence of ownership concentration on the prob-
ability of a change in ownership structure, in addition to the Log(M1) variable, 
the dummy variable CONTROL has been employed in our research, whereby it is 
presented as a value of 1 in the presence of an ultimate owner (based on Rules 1 
or 2 as outlined above), or as a value of 0 if the ownership structure is determined 
to be dispersed (based on Rule 3 as outlined above). Despite the fact that previous 
research used the Herfindahl Index as a measure of ownership concentration, we 
were not able to use this indicator in our research due to the fact that it is not pub-
licly available for the companies in our sample, and cannot be calculated based 
on the publicly available data.
Dual function of the owners. Poor performance may be the result of weak 
management and, consequently, companies in financial distress that have weak 
management are more likely to be the subject of acquisitions and/or debt-to-equi-
ty conversions (empirically confirmed for the US market). In the case of the RS, 
in the event that creditors and potential buyers determine a company’s manage-
ment as being the main cause of its financial distress, the probability of a change 
in ownership structure could be higher if the owners and their family members 
were involved in management functions in the past (intuitive assumption). In 
order to account for the influence of dual functions carried out by the owners, 
the dummy variable MANAGEMENT was introduced, given a value of 1 if the 
ultimate owner or a member of his/her family is also a member of the Board of 
Directors, a member of the Supervisory Board, or a Director, while a value of 
0 is attributed to this variable if these actors have not held the aforementioned 
positions before or during the filing year, or during bankruptcy. For the purpose 
of this research, family members are defined as individuals with the same last 
name as the owner. 
– The third set 
Financial performance. Reorganisation plans are more likely to permit the old 
owners to keep their equity holdings in the reorganised company when the com-
pany is solvent at the confirmation of the plan (LoPucki – Whitford 1993). In 
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order to isolate the influence of the decisions made during the bankruptcy period, 
we have used financial figures that stem from the end of the fiscal year prior to 
bankruptcy. The same approach was used by LoPucki – Whitford (1993). In order 
to measure the degree of a company’s indebtedness, we used the current ratio 
(LIQUIDITY), calculated as a ratio between current assets and current liabili-
ties, and the debt/equity ratio (LEVERAGE), which compares the book value of 
total debt to the book value of total debt and equity combined. As a measure of 
the company’s profitability, we used ROA, EBITDA margin and the company’s 
unanticipated earnings (∆EBIT/AT). ROA is calculated by dividing a company’s 
annual earnings by average assets. The EBITDA margin (EBITDAMARGIN) is 
calculated as a ratio of EBITDA to sales revenue, whereby EBITDA is defined 
as the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortisation. The com-
pany’s unanticipated earnings (∆EBIT/AT) are calculated as the annual differ-
ence in earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), divided by the book value of 
assets at the beginning of the year (T-2), an indicator also used by Gilson (1990) 
in similar research. 
– The fourth set 
Bankruptcy duration. The effect of the time spent in bankruptcy on changes in 
ownership structure could be explained in two ways. First, as time passes, the 
bargaining power of the existing owners may decrease due to the decrease in 
the company’s overall value, which, in turn, reduces the readiness of creditors 
to keep the existing owners and management within the company. Second, in 
almost all cases, an insolvency administrator is in charge of a company’s affairs, 
which decreases the dependency of the company’s business on the existing own-
ers and increases the probability that the existing owners will be replaced by 
creditors or potential investors. In order to include the influence of the time spent 
in bankruptcy on the dependent variable, our research introduced the explanatory 
variable BANKRUPTCY TIME (log of one plus the number of months between 
the bankruptcy filing date and the date the bankruptcy ended). Furthermore, in 
order to take into account the entire period a company has spent in bankruptcy, 
the bankruptcy filing year represents the date when the court reached the decision 
to open bankruptcy, while the year in which the bankruptcy ended is determined 
by the date that the court’s decision confirming the adoption of the reorganisation 
plan is final.
See Appendix 2 for a summarised list of the variables used in this research.
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4.4. Models
In order to test the relationship between financial distress and ownership turno-
ver, we used the following general specifications: 
(1)  Ownership turnover = f (size variables, complexity of ownership structure 
variables), and the relevant model can be written as follows:
 OWN CHANGE = β1 × Log(AT) + β2 × Log(S) + β3 × PYRAMID + ε
(2)  Ownership turnover = f (ownership concentration variables, dual function 
variable), and the model is: 
  OWN CHANGE = β1 × Log(M1) + β2 × CONTROL + β3 × MANAGEMENT 
+ ε
(3)  Ownership turnover = f (financial performance variables, leverage variables), 
and the accompanying model is:
  OWN CHANGE = β1 × LEVERAGE + β2 × LIQUIDITY + β3 × ROA + β4 
× EBITDAMARGIN + β5 × ∆EBIT/AT + ε
(4)  Ownership turnover = f (bankruptcy duration variable), and the model is:
 OWN CHANGE = β1 × BANKRUPTCY TIME + ε
where ε represents random error.
In order to test the influence of the observed explanatory variables on the de-
pendent variable, we used binary logistic regression (BLR), which is one of the 
most prominent models employed in economic research regarding change in cor-
porate control (Abatecola et al. 2011). The independent variables were included 
in our models by applying the enter method, whereby all variables are included in 
the model simultaneously, and all regressions were run using SPSS software.
 5. RESULTS
Table 4 shows the ability of all of the tested models to predict change in owner-
ship structure in distressed companies. The overall percentage demonstrates that 
all four models have a similar predictive power (app. 80%). However, based on 
the Nagelkerke R Square and the Hosmer-Lemeshow Test significance, we can 
reach the conclusion that the second and third model has a better predictive power 
than the first and fourth model. 
Table 5 shows the BLR estimates for the four models, in which the explanatory 
variables were included in the model simultaneously.  
The significance of the explanatory variables presented in Table 5 demonstrates 
that the company’s size, the complexity of its ownership structure, its ownership 
concentration, its financial performance, and its leverage variables are not signifi-
cant determinants of ownership turnover. Instead, the involvement of the owners 
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in the management of distressed companies and the time needed to resolve a 
bankruptcy case become the key factors in the determination of the probability 
of ownership change. In companies in which the owners were involved in the 
management before they file for bankruptcy, ownership turnover is more likely to 
occur. Also, changes in ownership structure are more likely to occur in companies 
that spend more time in resolving a bankruptcy case. The sign of the coefficient 
of all explanatory variables, except for Log(AT), LEVERAGE, and ROA, is con-
sistent with the assumptions made in the research. Finally, Table 5 reports that 
Hypotheses 1 and 3 do not moderate the relationship between financial distress 
and ownership turnover, Hypothesis 2 partially moderates, while Hypothesis 4 
strongly moderates.  
Limitations
This research encountered three significant limitations. Firstly, despite the fact 
that large and medium-sized companies in Serbia are subject to external financial 
audits, financial reports continue to contain hidden losses. For this reason, the 
ratios calculated in this research may not be fully reliable or accurate. Secondly, 
due to the relatively small number of observations within the category of changed 
ownership structure, variables with non-significant effects might be estimated to 
be smaller than those with significant effects. To be able to detect reasonable size 
effects with reasonable power, future research will need to have at least 10 ob-
servations per estimated variable (Peduzzi et al. 1996). Thirdly, Durbin-Watson 
statistics indicate the presence of positive autocorrelation in our models, while 
the graphical representation of the residuals indicates the absence of autocorrela-
tion. The source of the potential autocorrelation could be a misspecification of the 
Table 4. Predictive power of the models
Observed First model Second model Third model Fourth model
OWN. 
CHANGE
% 
Correct
OWN. 
CHANGE
% 
Correct
OWN. 
CHANGE
% 
Correct
OWN. 
CHANGE
% 
Correct
OWN. 
CHANGE
0 49 0 100.00 45 4 91.80 47 2 95.90 47 2 95.90
1 13 1 7.10 9 5 35.70 10 4 28.60 11 3 21.40
Overall 
percentage  79.40  79.40  81  79.40
Nagelkerke 
R Square 0.08 0.29 0.13 0.16
Hosmer-
Lemeshow 
Test sig.
0.91 0.81 0.56 0.24
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functional form of the models. However, the limited number of observations and 
the lack of similar research for transition economies do not allow us to define the 
models more broadly. 
Despite the aforementioned limitations, the results offer valuable insights re-
garding the existing corporate governance practice in distressed companies in 
Serbia.
Table 5. Predictive power of the models
First model
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Step 1a Log(AT) 0.88 1.06 0.69 1 0.41 2.41
Log(S) –0.93 0.60 2.38 1 0.12 0.39
PYRAMID –0.62 0.67 0.86 1 0.35 0.54
Constant –1.30 3.43 0.14 1 0.71 0.27
a. Variable(s) entered in step 1: LogAT, LogS, PYRAMID
Second model
Variables in the equation
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Step 1a Log(M1) –8.37 6.43 1.70 1 0.19 0.00
CONTROL –1.07 1.05 1.04 1 0.31 0.34
MANAGEMENT 2.22 0.74 9.10 1 0.00 9.25
Constant –0.28 1.70 0.03 1 0.87 0.75
a. Variable(s) entered in step 1: LogM1, CONTROL, MANAGEMENT
Third model
Variables in the equation
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Step 1a LIQUIDITY –1.08 1.11 0.94 1 0.33 0.34
LEVERAGE –0.74 1.01 0.53 1 0.47 0.48
ROA 7.97 6.24 1.63 1 0.20 2,898.24
EBITDAMARGIN –0.14 0.15 0.94 1 0.33 0.87
∆EBIT/AT –8.21 5.78 2.01 1 0.16 0.00
Constant 0.19 1.02 0.03 1 0.86 1.20
a. Variable(s) entered in step 1: LIQUIDITY, LEVERAGE, ROA, EBITDAMARGIN, EBITAT
Fourth model
Variables in the equation
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Step 1a BANKRUPTCY TIME 3.06 1.25 6.01 1 0.01 21.26
Constant –4.54 1.44 9.92 1 0.00 0.01
a. Variable(s) entered in step 1: BANKRUPTCY TIME
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6. DISCUSSION
Our research demonstrated that financial distress has no significant effect on own-
ership structure in the vast majority of companies. The BLR estimates show that 
the previous involvement of the owners in the company’s management and the 
time spent in bankruptcy increase the probability of ownership turnover, while 
the influence of all other variables on the ownership structure was deemed to be 
statistically insignificant. We also observed that the present owner and their fam-
ily members retain the key management positions in the reorganised companies. 
These findings differ considerably from those that have been reported in the case 
of the US and Germany, and several factors can be used to elaborate on the results 
obtained. Firstly, the business of the reorganised companies is highly dependent 
on the existing owners. They are in the unique position of knowing the company’s 
business and the reasons for its financial distress, while their reputation and po-
litical connections give them sufficient power over the bankruptcy proceedings. 
In such situations, the market for corporate control will function poorly, as the 
company’s insiders cannot be challenged. Secondly, great uncertainty and asym-
metric information between the company’s management and the claimants place 
creditors at a serious disadvantage in comparison to the company’s managers and 
owners. Furthermore, some of the creditors have state ownership and have less 
incentive to be strong debt collectors. Altogether, this results in a passive role of 
creditors in the bankruptcy process. Thirdly, due to the undeveloped capital mar-
ket and poor legal protection for minority shareholders, any dilution of ownership 
would lead to poor financial performance in distressed companies, and creditors 
might avoid debt-equity swaps. Lastly, as Gray et al. (1996) also point out, con-
trol rights will not necessarily change when the whole economy is facing crises 
because the financial distress may not be caused by internal deficiencies in the 
mechanisms of corporate control. 
The current practice in the RS could be changed by strengthening banking 
and bankruptcy regulation reforms, improving macroeconomic discipline, and 
imposing liability on a company’s management to provide the requisite trans-
parency to all of the company’s investors. Moreover, an active role of banks in 
bankruptcy proceedings and the acceleration of corporate governance changes 
can help the banking sector to resolve the problem of growing NPL portfolios, 
and enable the rehabilitation of the Serbian corporate sector, which is facing a 
lack of liquidity and solvency. 
This study produced conceptual and methodological implications for future 
research and the practice of corporate governance in distressed companies in 
transition economies. At this moment, the number of observations is too limited 
to allow generalisations; however, future studies should define a model that tests 
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the influence of financial distress on the mechanisms of corporate control more 
broadly. Also, we recommend future research to examine whether changes in 
ownership structure affect the long-term performance of reorganised companies 
and, consequently, their chances for survival. Two important research questions 
that should be addressed are whether the disposal of the equity of existing owners 
and their replacement in key managerial positions by new managers with skills in 
managing distressed companies have the potential to facilitate reforms pertaining 
to corporate governance in transition economies; and furthermore, whether the 
existence of multiple large-scale shareholders and vulture investors might facili-
tate investments in financially distressed companies. In the event of a positive 
answer to both of these queries, it could be expected that changes in the corporate 
governance of distressed companies would foster the development of primary 
and secondary markets for these companies.
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APPENDIX 1
Comparison of the US, German and Serbian bankruptcy rules
Characteristics United States Germany Republic of Serbia
Right to initiate the 
process
Debtor within 180 
days. After the 
exclusivity period 
expires, the plan can 
file other parties in 
interest in a case. Debtor and creditors. 
Debtor can file Pre-
pack Reorganisation 
Plan, while debtor, 
creditor, owner, 
or insolvency 
administrator can 
file a reorganisation 
plan in a regular 
bankruptcy procedure. 
Private benefits 
for the company’s 
stakeholders
Gives considerable 
weight to the private 
benefits of distressed 
firm’s stakeholders.
May play an 
important role in the 
restructuring of the 
distressed firm.
Do not play an 
important role in the 
restructuring of the 
distressed firm.
Automatic stay 
provision
Most creditor claims 
are stayed (except, 
e.g., lease payments).
Automatic stay for 
unsecured; minimum 
of three months for 
secured.
In the case of a regular 
bankruptcy procedure, 
AS rule is applied 
to all creditors, 
while in the case 
of a pre-insolvency 
restructuring 
proceeding, it applies, 
on the request of a 
judge, to all or some 
creditors.
Control rights during 
bankruptcy Debtor in control.
Creditor’s committee 
in control. 
In almost all 
cases, the court 
appoints insolvency 
administrators who 
control the company’s 
business.
Preservation of 
residual claims of 
equity holders 
In majority of cases, 
deviations from 
absolute priority in 
favour of equity.
Deviations can be 
proposed, but must be 
approved (i.e. voted 
on) by creditors.
The owners do not 
vote on the plan and 
deviations from AP 
rule must be approved 
(i.e. voted on) by 
creditors.
Approval condition
The plan is accepted 
by creditors that hold 
at least two-thirds in 
amount and more than 
one-half of the number 
of the allowed claims 
in the class.
The plan is accepted 
by a simple majority 
of each class and ½ 
volume of claims 
with prohibition on 
obstruction.
The plan is accepted 
by a simple majority 
of each class and ½ 
volume of claims, 
creditor’s obstruction 
is not restricted. 
Source: The rules for the US and Germany have been summarised by Wang (2012: 5) and Balcerowicz et al. 
(2003: 15), while the rules applicable for Serbia have been summarised by the authors. 
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APPENDIX 2
Overview of the research variables
Variable names Definition
OWN CHANGE A dummy variable with a value of 1 if ownership changes, 
otherwise, a value of 0
Log(AT) The log of the book value of non-deflated assets, used to measure 
the size of a company
Log(S) The log of the book value of sales revenue, used to measure the 
size of a company
PYRAMID A dummy variable with a value of 1 if a company has a pyramid 
structure, otherwise, a value of 0
Log(M1) The log of one plus the equity holdings of the first largest 
proprietor
CONTROL A dummy variable with a value of 1 if a company has an ultimate 
shareholder, calculated based on the concept of control, otherwise, 
a value of 0
MANAGEMENT A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the owner or member of 
his/her family is also a member of the Board of Directors, the 
Supervisory Board or a Director; a value of 0 if they do not hold 
the mentioned positions after the company reorganisation
LIQUIDITY The ratio of current assets to current liabilities
LEVERAGE Book value of total debt to the book value of total debt and equity 
combined
ROA Net income divided by average total assets
EBITDAMARGIN The ratio of EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, 
and amortisation) to sales revenue
∆EBIT/AT Earnings before interest and taxes divided by the book value of 
assets at the beginning of the year
BANKRUPTCY TIME Log of value one plus the number of months spent from the 
bankruptcy filing date to the date when the bankruptcy ended
